The endogenous growth literature has stimulated empirical research into links between trade and growth in general and international knowledge spillovers in particular. Results relating to the latter have been mixed and the issue of the appropriate construction of the spillover variable remains contentious. In this paper we develop measures taking account of whether knowledge is a public or private good in the donor and recipient countries, and include these in a dynamic panel model of growth. For a sample of five OECD donor countries and 52 developing recipient countries, we conclude that it matters little whether we treat knowledge as a private or public good in the donor but that spillovers, if they exist, act as a public good in the recipient. We also find that the level of trade is important in facilitating knowledge spillovers from donors to recipients.
Introduction
The development of theories of endogenous growth has revived interest in the relationship between trade and growth. Recent theories of endogenous technological change (e.g. Romer (1986) , Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman and Helpman (1991) ) provide a rationale for examining international knowledge spillovers through trade. In a simple variant of these models, final output is produced using intermediate inputs, which may be horizontally or vertically differentiated. R&D affects output by increasing the number, or improving the quality, of available intermediates. In the absence of trade, a country's output is determined by its own cumulative past R&D expenditure. With trade a relationship between cumulative R&D and output remains, but the relevant measure is now the world R&D stock.
These theories underpin empirical testing of the hypothesis that countries that are more open to imports from partners with a high level of technological knowledge should have higher rates of growth than those that are either closed to trade, or trade with countries with low levels of technological knowledge. While knowledge spillovers can be independent of the actual volume of trade in the simple theoretical models, there are reasons to believe that the trade volume may be important in facilitating spillovers, depending on the extent to which knowledge is a public good in the donor and recipient countries.
The approach used in empirical work has been to construct a "stock of knowledge" for each developed country, and then measure access of other countries to this by weighting these stocks by some measure of the volume or share of bilateral trade. Evidence of knowledge spillovers on trading partners' rates of total factor productivity (TFP) growth have been found among developed countries by Coe and Helpman (1995) (CH) , and from developed to developing countries by Coe, Helpman and Hoffmaister (1997) (CHH) . But these outcomes depend, inter alia, on the weighting sche me employed, and the construction and interpretation of the foreign knowledge spillover variable remains contentious.
In this paper we test for the presence of North-South knowledge spillovers for a sample of 52 developing countries in a model of economic growth 1 . We use data on the manufacturing R&D expenditure of five OECD 2 economies, testing for the presence of knowledge spillovers from these five 'donor' countries to our sample of 52 'recipient' countries. The paper differs from the CH and CHH papers i n important ways however. Firstly, we argue that different weighting schemes are appropriate, depending on whether the knowledge stock is best regarded as a public or private good in the origin country; and whether the knowledge spillover is best regarded as a public or private good in the recipient. The measures that emerge under different assumptions are specified in section 4.2. Secondly, we examine the impact of knowledge spillovers on output growth rather than Total Factor Productivity (TFP)
growth. Finally, we employ a dynamic panel specification for our model. This technique has advantages over previous methods, since it allows knowledge spillovers to have both a shortrun and a long-run impact on growth, and it avoids the problems associated with the nonstationarity of the foreign knowledge variables.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the theoretical background concerning knowledge spillovers and the role of trade as a mechanism for the transmission of knowledge. Section 3 reviews the issues raised by the existing empirical literature, while Section 4 describes how we estimate the impact of foreign knowledge spillovers on growth. Section 5 reports and discusses the results, while Section 6 provides some overall conclusions.
Theoretical Background
It has long been recognised that international technology transfer is an important source of growth, and that the progress of both developed and developing nations may be determined in part by its extent. Yet until the arrival of endogenous growth theory little systematic empirical analysis of this issue had been undertaken. During the 1960s and 1970s a number of authors, in particular Gerschenkron (1962) and Kuznets (1973) talked of the so-called 'advantage of backwardness'. They argued that being a technological laggard had the advantage that it would be possible to 'borrow' new technology from the leading edge countries. Others, such as Abramovitz (1986) , argued that in order to obtain such benefits other factors that affect the ability to adopt such technology needed to be in place, these factors being termed 'social capability'.
From the theoretical literature CHH identify four channels through which international contacts may allow knowledge produced in one country to affect productivity and growth in others. First they allow a country to employ intermediate and capital goods from abroad, which may enhance the productivity of domestic resources. Second, by increasing communication between countries, they c an encourage a more efficient employment of domestic resources through cross-border learning of production methods, product design, organisational structures and market conditions. Third they can also assist countries inside the technological frontier in i mitating the products of countries at the frontier. Finally, they can raise a country's productivity in the development of new technologies or the imitation of foreign technology.
International trade has been highlighted as the major source of such knowledge spillovers and this is our focus here 3 . It is not just whether a country trades that is likely to be important for knowledge spillovers, but also with which countries it trades. In order to benefit from advanced technology and knowledge, the country must trade with countries that are able to provide it with such knowledge. Given that R&D is concentrated in a small number of developed countries 4 , we expect that developing countries would most likely gain access to knowledge through their trade with the developed world.
When examining the impact of trade on growth in theoretical models, the comparison is usually made between autarky and free trade. Few papers examine how trade policy and changes in openness affect growth. The implication of these theories is that a movement away from autarky will result in positive knowledge spillovers, with the actual volume of trade being unimportant 5 . Imports of any quantity of the relevant products, no matter how small, will result in positive spillovers (see Keller, 1998 Keller, , 2000 . However, if spillovers are not pure public goods, the volume of trade may be important in facilitating their diffusion within the 3 Other channels are also likely to be the source of such spillovers. The 1999 World Development Report for example suggests additional factors such as FDI, migration, technology licensing and electronic interchange. Xu and Wang (2000) consider the role of FDI in technology diffusion among OECD countries. Similarly, although we concentrate here on the role of imports, the role of exports should not be dismissed as a potential source of knowledge spillovers, for example through customers supplying feedback on the product specification. 4 Eaton and Kortum (1999) note that in the late 1980s, 80 percent of OECD research scientists and engineers were employed in our five donor countries. Funk (2001) concludes from his empirical analysis of spillovers among the OECD nations, that knowledge flows emerge primarily from the most advanced memb ers. 5 In the models of horizontal innovation and growth (see for example, Grossman and Helpman, 1991, ch. 3) , growth depends upon the number of intermediates employed, not on the amount of each intermediate employed.
Openness by allowing the importation of a greater variety of intermediates into a country would be expected to raise a country's growth rate, while the level of trade, which indicates the volume of intermediates imported would not affect growth.
recipient. For developing countries, it is likely that final goods producers will be the main beneficiaries of knowledge spillovers, since the innovation sector will be rather small. In this situation the level of imports may be important by allowing a greater number of firms to benefit from imported technology. The separate roles of the volume of trade and the level of openness are also examined in this paper.
Evidence on International Knowledge Spillovers
An empirical literature has been in existence for some time examining knowledge spillovers among industries and firms within countries 6 . Recently, in response to the endogenous theories of trade and growth, a literature looking to test for the presence of international knowledge spillovers has emerged. CH test for the presence of international knowledge spillovers among a sample of 22 developed countries over the period [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] . They study the extent to which a country's productivity depends upon both domestic and foreign knowledge stocks, where cumulative R&D expenditures are used as a proxy for the knowledge stock of a country. The foreign knowledge stock is constructed using the weighted sum of trade partners' cumulative R&D spending. The weights used are bilateral import shares, since it is assumed that it is a country's imports that act as the conduit for knowledge spillovers. The import share weighted foreign knowledge stock is also interacted with the volume of imports to examine the importance of the volume of trade as well as its distribution. They find both the domestic and foreign knowledge stocks to be important sources of productivity growth, although the former has a much larger impact on productivity in the larger countries. Smaller countries, it is argued, tend to be more open and benefit more from foreign knowledge than larger countries 7 . From these results CH conclude that a relationship between productivity and both the foreign and domestic knowledge stocks exists, with the countries gaining most from foreign knowledge being those that are most open to trade.
CHH adapt the analysis of CH to examine the extent of North-South R&D spillovers. They test for the presence of knowledge spillovers through international trade from the 22 developed countries in the CH study to a sample of 77 developing countries over the period [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] . The method used is similar to that by CH, except that they use data averaged over four five-year periods rather than annual data. It is further assumed by CHH that no R&D is undertaken in the developing countries, so that no domestic knowledge stock is created. The foreign knowledge stocks for the developing countries are created using a weighted average of the knowledge stocks of the industrial countries. The weights being bilateral import shares of machinery and equipment, used as a measure of the imports of capital and intermediate goods.
As with the CH study, this import share weighted foreign knowledge stock is also interacted with the volume of imports. They find that knowledge spillovers from the industrial North to the developing South are substantial. On average, a 1 percent increase in the knowledge stocks of the i ndustrial countries raises productivity growth in the developing countries by 0.06 percent.
The CH methods have been controversial. Keller (1998) compared their results with those obtained from assigning bilateral trade partners randomly and found that regressions based on such simulated data generated on average larger estimated foreign knowledge spillovers, as well as a better fit in terms of R 2 . He concluded that the CH results may say little about the extent of foreign knowledge spillovers. Coe and Hoffmaister (1999) note that Keller's bilateral import shares are similar to equal weights, or simple averages of trading partners knowledge stocks, suggesting that Keller's weights are not in fact random. They derive three alternative sets of random weights that do not exhibit this property. When these are used to define the foreign knowledge stock, the estimated foreign knowledge spillover estimates are extremely small and the equations explain less of the variation in productivity than when the true bilateral import shares are used. From these results they conclude that using bilateral import weights or even simple averages to create a measure of foreign knowledge performs better than using random weights, suggesting that a country's productivity is related to its trading partners' knowledge stock. It is noted, however, that the importance of the actual intensity of the trading relationship is an unresolved issue, because of the public good nature of knowledge. Openness to trade appears to be important for the knowledge spillover, but the volume of trade may or may not be.
CH in their original analysis find that all of their data exhibited a clear trend, but that a cointegrating relationship existed between the variables, which allowed them to consider a relationship between the levels of the variables without having to transform the data. They chose not to report t-statistics for their results, because at the time the asymptotic distribution of the t-statistic was unknown. Kao et al (1999) argue that since the estimated coefficients are quite small it is not clear whether the estimated coefficients are different from zero. 
Estimating the Impact of Knowledge Spillovers
Overall the evidence in favour of international knowledge spillovers using this method is mixed. Some studies have found a positive effect of foreign knowledge on productivity and growth, both among developed countries and also from developed to developing countries.
Others have found no such relationship. There has also been debate over the appropriate construction of the knowledge stocks. In this section we describe our procedure for testing for the presence of growth enhancing effects of foreign knowledge using a dynamic panel model.
We adopt the CH method to create foreign knowledge stocks and use a number of different weighting schemes for the spillover measures.
Empirical Specification
While the majority of existing empirical studies examine the impact of knowledge spillovers on an index of TFP growth, we find it convenient to adopt a method similar to that employed by Evenson and Singh (1997) , examining their impact directly on output growth. In principle the choice between the two should not be too important. But focussing on output growth avoids the errors one might introduce in calculating TFP, and allows a more ready comparison with the majority of growth equations. In particular, we can examine the sensitivity of our knowledge spillover results to the inclusion of other variables found to be significant in growth regressions. The empirical specification for our growth model follows Greenaway, Morgan and Wright (1997 , 1998 , who argue that following the work of Levine and Renelt (1992) and Sala- 
where y i,t-1 are lags of the dependent variable.
Constructing Foreign Knowledge Stocks
We construct knowledge stocks for each of the five OECD countries that represent our "donors" by cumulating its past (total manufacturing) R&D expenditure, as proposed by Griliches (1979) . Let K dt denote the stock of knowledge of donor d at time t. To create alternative measures of the spillover of these knowledge stocks to each "recipient" through trade, the K dt are then weighted in various ways, reflecting different interpretations of the nature of the spillover. The underlying notion is that a unit of imports is a "message" that contains information on the "knowledge" used to produce it. If knowledge is a (pure) public good in the donor, a representative unit of imports can be viewed as giving information on all of K dt . But if knowledge is a (pure) private good in the donor, then the representative unit of imports is better viewed as only giving information on a proportion of this knowledge, say dt dt /Q K , where Q dt is the level of GDP in the donor at time t. The second issue is the degree of "publicness" of the information transferred in the recipient. If this information is a public good then it will be available to all agents in the recipient. But if this information is a private good, then its availability will be limited to a few agents in the recipient. In this case we need to "scale" the information transfer to get the spillover effect on the recipient economy, and there are two alternative bases we can use for this purpose. One is the total volume of imports of the recipient, in which case the important feature is information transferred per unit of imports. The alternative is recipient output, in which case the information transferred is distributed across the economic activity in the economy.
Were information on donor knowledge stocks to be independent of the volume of trade, all recipients would benefit equally from any knowledge spillovers, since they all trade with our group of donors. Such an outcome is both uninteresting and, more importantly, unlikely.
More realistically the volume of trade should feature in the spillover variable, since the larger the number of messages, the more information that is potentially available. We therefore construct fo ur alternative measures, including bilateral trade flows in each case and, in some cases, deflating by donor output where "knowledge" is a private good in the donor, and by recipient output (or imports) where the knowledge spillover is a private good in the recipient 13 .
We begin with those measures that have been used in the empirical literature. Suppose that knowledge is a public good in the donor, and that the spillover from each donor depends on Interestingly, if we consider the opposite case, where knowledge is viewed as a private good in the donor country, but the knowledge spillover is a public good in the recipient, we have the specification proposed by Lichtenberg and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (1998). Now the formulation is 13 Note that while both knowledge stocks and knowledge spillovers can be public goods, the latter would appear to be inherently more public than the former. Given the differences in institutions, sophistication of infrastructure, and definition and enforcement of property rights etc. between developed donors and developing recipients, it is not difficult to imagine that the degree of "publicness" differs between the two. 14 In fact the preferred specification of Coe and Helpman, CHH and others is a variant of (1Q) that is the product of the recipient's import share ) ( rt Q rt M and the log of the trade share weighted knowledge stocks.
where we can think of K dt /Q dt as the intensity of knowledge embodied in the relevant imports.
Their proposal arises from the observation that the foreign knowledge stocks as specified by Coe and Helpman are sensitive to aggregation, since a merger between donor countries would always increase the measured stock of knowledge, yet it is not clear why such a merger would be expected to increase the level of knowledge in the world. Specification (2) removes the importance of the scale of the donor economy from the trade weighted knowledge stock This leaves two further measures that are untested to date. If it were appropriate to view both knowledge and knowledge spillove rs as public goods, the relevant measure becomes
Finally, it may be that knowledge stocks and spillovers are both private goods. As above we have two possible deflators for the trade weighted knowledge stocks. If we use the total imports of the recipient, we have
While if we use recipient GDP as the deflator, the relevant measure is
These are the alternative measures of foreign knowledge spillovers that are considered below.
In each case the weights we use relate to total manufacturing imports 15 from these five donors to the relevant recipient.
Results
Data was collected on all variables for all 52 countries between 1976 and 1990. Due to first differencing however we lose one observation for each country 16 . The results from the static model are reported in Tables 1 and 2, while Tables 3 and 4 reports the results from the dynamic model. 15 The import data are total manufacturing exports from the donor to the recipient and are taken from the OECD publication, International Trade by Commodity Statistic. 16 Much of the data used was taken from the dataset of Greenaway, Morgan and Wright (1998) . R&D data was taken from the OECD ANBERD dataset.
If we begin with the static results in Table 1 , we find that the majority of the core variables in the model are of the expected sign and significant. This is true for the ratio of investment to GDP, initial GDP, secondary schooling and to a lesser degree population growth. The coefficient on the terms of trade variable tends to be of the expected sign, but is never significant. The coefficients on the core variables tend to be stable across specifications.
Turning to the coefficients on the spillover variables, we find positive and significant coefficients in four specifications (namely 1Q, 2, 3 and 4Q) and negative and significant coefficients in the remaining two (1M and 4M). As we note below, the negative coefficients are inconsistent with the interpretation of this variable as a "knowledge spillover", but are not unprecedented. CHH often find that when the knowledge stocks are weighted by the share of trade, the coefficient on the spillover variable is negative. They only find consistently positive and significant coefficients on the spillover variable when the spillover depends upon the level of trade. These results therefore confirm the results of CHH and suggest that the level of trade is important in facilitating the diffusion of knowledge.
In Table 2 , we add the measure of openness to the estimated growth model. The inclusion of the Sachs and Warner openness measure has little impact upon the size and significance of the core variables in the model, except for population, which falls in absolute size and becomes insignificant. The inclusion of the openness measure also has no impact upon the size and significance of the spillover variables. We again find positive and significant coefficients in the case of specifications 1Q, 2, 3 and 4Q, and negative and significant coefficients in the case of specifications 1M and 4M. The coefficient on the openness measure is itself positive and significant. This is in contrast to Coe and Helpman and CHH who find negative coefficients on their measures of openness, and suggests that openness has an impact on growth in addition to any indirect role in knowledge diffusion 17 . Tables 3 and 4 report the results from estimating the dynamic model. The Sargan test is satisfied and the test for second order correlation is rejected, suggesting that the equation is appropriately specified. Beginning with Table 3 , we see that the coefficients on most of the core variables change very little from the static model, although the coefficient on the 17 Their use of the imports to GDP ratio to measure openness raises the potential for mu lticollinearity between the openness and spillover variables, which may explain their finding. It should be noted that the Sachs and Warner measure has been criticised as a measure of "openness to international trade" by Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) , and it could well be capturing other aspects of openness here.
investment to GDP ratio increases somewhat and the coefficient on the terms of trade index is often now significant. The sign of the coefficients on the spillover variables remain the same, with positive coefficients in four cases and negative coefficients in the remaining two. The size of the coefficients on the spillover variables do not alter a great deal from the static specification, although the coefficients are not significant in specifications 1Q and 4Q when the model is estimated dynamically. Table 4 estimates the dynamic model with the openness measure included. The coefficients on the core variables are broadly similar, except that population growth now becomes positive and often significant. Turning to the spillover variables, the coefficients on each variable are again of the same signs as previously, and are significant except in specifications 1Q and 4Q. Once again the openness measure itself is positive and significant.
When we examine the full set of results for the spillover variables, we find that our measures group naturally into three pairs. Our results imply that: first, regardless of whether knowledge is a private or public good in the donor, when the corresponding spillover is deflated by the recipients total imports (yielding measures 1M and 4M), the estimated coefficient is negative and significant. We note that these are the measures that allow for the distribution of trade but not its volume, and that such an outcome is inconsistent with the interpretation of this variable as a knowledge spillover 18 . Second, regardless of whether knowledge is a private or public good in the donor, when the corresponding spillover is deflated by the recipient's GDP (yielding measures 1Q and 4Q), the estimated coefficient is positive but insignificant in the dynamic model. If the spillover is treated as a private good in the recip ient, there is only weak evidence that knowledge spillovers affect growth. Third, regardless of whether knowledge is a private or public good in the donor, when the corresponding spillover is treated as a public good in the recipient (yielding measures 2 and 3) the estimated coefficient is positive and significant. For these measures we do have evidence of knowledge spillovers, that appears to be robust. 
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The coefficients on the knowledge spillover variables in Tables 1 and 2 The coefficients on the spillover variables in the dynamic model are interpreted as giving the short-run impact on growth of knowledge spillovers and suggest that a 1 percent increase in the knowledge stocks of the developed countries will increase growth by between 0.01 and 0.06 percent. In the dynamic model we can also estimate the long-run impact of the spillover variables on the growth of GDP per capita, using the formula ∑ ∑
where β is the coefficient on the foreign knowledge variable and α i are the coefficients on the lagged dependent variables. Table 5 reports the estimated long-run impacts of foreign knowledge on growth for the four specifications that result in positive coefficients. An increase in the knowledge stock in the developed countries of 1 percent would lead on average to an increase in the long-run growth rate of between 0.011 and 0.071 percent depending upon the specification of the spillover variable and whether openness is included in the growth model or not. In general, the estimated short-run and long-run impact of foreign knowledge spillovers are quite similar, which may seem surprising if we expect knowledge to diffuse slowly, therefore having a greater impact on growth in the long-run. It should be noted however, that we are only using 14 years of data to estimate a long-run relationship, it may be that knowledge takes longer than this period of time to diffuse fully. Alternatively, the constructed knowledge stocks may be capturing a form of diffusion that has an immediate impact on growth, for example the use of advanced machinery, which once imported is immediately more productive.
Conclusions
It has long been thought that foreign knowledge spillovers may be important to the growth process, with trade being one mechanism through which spillovers occur. Endogenous growth theory suggests that a country whose trade partners have high levels of technology should grow faster, since through trade they gain access to the knowledge produced in these countries. Studies have tested for a relationship between productivity and foreign knowledge, where the latter is taken to be cumulative R&D expenditures. It is assumed that either import shares or import volumes determine access to such knowledge, because international trade allows the importation of products that embody advanced technology and knowledge, and access to information that could otherwise not be acquired. The results of these studies are mixed, and while some evidence in support of foreign knowledge spillovers has been found, it
is not universal and debate continues over the appropriate construction and weighting of the spillover measures and the estimation procedures employed.
We test for the presence of spillovers from the five leading OECD economies (in terms of R&D expenditure) to a sample of developing countries, following closely the methodology of CH and CHH to construct the variables representing foreign knowledge. We depart from the standard literature in three respects. Firstly, we employed a number of weighting schemes for the knowledge spillover variable in order attempt to draw some inferences as to the nature of the spillover, and to test the robustness of the results obtained. Second, we employed a growth model which allows us to more adequately capture other factors that may affect the extent of knowledge spillovers that are not taken account of in TFP calculations. Finally, we employed a dynamic panel model of GDP growth, which had the advantage that it allowed knowledge spillovers to have both a short-run and long-run impact on growth. The problem of non-stationarity of the knowledge stocks is also eliminated using this approach.
A standard growth model was estimated for a sample of 52 developing countries. The results lead to a consistent set of results on knowledge spillovers, in that only those specifications that depend upon the level of imports result in positive coefficients. The strongest support is for cases where knowledge is either a private or public good in the donor, but where ther knowledge spillover is a public good in the recipient. The results from the specifications that do depend upon the level of imports suggest that a 1 percent increase in the knowledge stock of the developed countries can increase growth in the developing countries by between 0.01 and 0.07 percent in the short-run. The long-run impact of knowledge spillovers on growth was found to be very similar to that in the short-run. The fact that the initial GDP term remains negative and significant when spillover variables are included suggests that spillovers don't exhaust the advantages of backwardness. A further implication of these results, is that openness affects growth through channels other than knowledge diffusion, a result not found by Coe and Helpman and CHH.
